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Abstract—This paper analyzes an attack-defense game between 
one defender and one attacker. Among, the defender moves first 
and allocates its resources to three different methods: employing 
a preventive strike, founding false targets, and protecting its 
genuine object. The preventive strike may expose the genuine 
object, and different from previous literature, a false target may 
also be detected to be false. The attacker, observing the actions 
taken by the defender and allocating its resources to three 
methods: protecting its own base from the preventive strike, 
founding false bases, and attacking the defender’s genuine object. 
Similarly, a false base may be correctly identified. Different from 
previous methods in evaluating the potential outcome, for each of 
the defender’s given strategies, the attacker tries to maximize its 
cumulative prospect value considering different possible 
outcomes. Similarly, the defender maximizes its cumulative 
prospect value, assuming that the attacker chooses the strategy to 
maximize the attacker’s cumulative prospect value. Numerical 
examples are presented to illustrate the optimal number of bases 
to attack by preventive strike, and the optimal number of targets 
to attack by attacker.  
Keywords- Imperfect false target; preventive strike; vulnerability; 
attack-defense game; cumulative prospect 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Launching preventive strike and deploying false targets are 
two efficient methods for the defense of genuine objects 
against intentional attacks. Recently, more publications have 
started considering the attacker’s risk attitude and analyzing the 
cases where both the attacker and the defender allocate 
different resource on different strategies [1], [2], [3]. The 
defender may employ the strategies of preventive strike to gain 
the initiative, use false targets to distract the attention of the 
attacker, and protect the genuine object to reduce its 
vulnerability in case it is attacked. The attacker, in response, 
may protect its base against preventive strike, deploy false 
bases to distract the defender, and attack the defender’s genuine 
object. The vulnerability of the attacker’s base and the 
defender’s genuine object is usually characterized by the 
Tullock model in an attack-defense game [4]. One common 
assumption of the existing work is that employing preventive 
strike will expose the true object and thus there is no need to 
deploy false targets in case the preventive strike strategy is 
applied. In reality, nevertheless, the defender may choose to 
launch preventive strike from a location different from where 
the genuine object is located or even require a third party to 
launch the preventive strike. As a result, the genuine object 
may be exposed only with some probability and deploying 
false targets may still be an effective strategy. 
In this paper, we consider the employment of both 
preventive strike and false targets (i.e., camouflages). It 
assumes that the preventive strike may expose the genuine 
object with some probability. In addition, a false target is 
assumed imperfect in the sense that it may be detected. While 
the defender may launch a preventive strike, protect the 
genuine object, or deploy false targets, the attacker may protect 
its genuine base against preventive strike, deploy false bases, or 
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launch attacks aiming to destroying the defender’s genuine 
object. There may therefore be three different outcomes of the 
contest: 1) the attacker’s base is destroyed by a preventive 
strike; 2) The attacker’s genuine base survives a preventive 
strike, and the defender’s genuine object also survives the 
attacker’s attack; 3) The attacker’s genuine base survives a 
preventive strike and successfully destroys defender’s genuine 
object. We should further note that once the base is destroyed 
by the preventive strike, the attacker cannot attack the object. 
In order to consider both the defender’s and the attacker’s risk 
attitudes, the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is used to 
calculate their cumulative prospect value of both parties 
considering all possible outcomes of the contest [5]. Typically, 
the defender moves first with the aim to maximize its 
cumulative prospect value, assuming that the attacker 
maximizes its own cumulative prospect value for any 
defender’s strategy. The major contributions of this paper 
conclude: 1) the false target of the defender and the false base 
of the attacker may be correctly identified; 2) the cumulative 
prospect value is employed to evaluate the potential outcome of 
both the defender and the attacker. Section 2 presents the 
general model for solving the optimal defense and attack 
strategies. Section 3 presents numerical examples to illustrate 
the optimal number of attacks bases by preventive strike, and 
the optimal number of attacked targets by attacker. Section 4 
concludes.  
II. THE MODEL 
Consider a defender who owns a single genuine object 
subjected to intentional attacks by an attacker. The defender 
distributes its resource r  into three different measures: 
(0 1)rx x   for preventive strike with unit strike effort cost 
psc , (1 ) (0 1)r x y y    for building false targets with unit 
cost ftc , and (1 )(1 )r x y   for protecting the genuine object 
with unit protection effort cost ptc . The attacker also 
distributes its resource on three measures: (0 1)RX X   for 
protecting its own base from the preventive strike with unit 
protection effort cost bpC , (1 ) (0 1)R X Y Y     for building 
false bases with unit cost fbC , and (1 )(1 )R X Y   for 
attacking the genuine object with unit attack effort cost 
atC . 
The probability of correctly detecting a false target is denoted 
by ftd , whereas the probability of correctly detecting a false 
base is denoted by fbD . 
In an attack-defense game considering perfect information, 
the defender takes action first and the attacker moves only after 
observing the resource allocation of the defender. Specifically, 
the CPT is used and both the defender and the attacker are 
assumed to try to maximize their own respective cumulative 
prospect by considering different possible outcomes in this 
paper. That is, the attacker chooses its attack strategy to 
maximize its cumulative prospect value for any given defense 
strategy; and the defender maximizes its cumulative prospect 
value anticipating that the attacker always chooses the attack 
strategy to maximize the attacker’s cumulative prospect value. 
It is assumed that the preventive strike may uncover its genuine 
object with a probability 
exd .  
As the attacker deploys false bases, the defender will 
distribute its preventive resource evenly into 
dQ  
( 1 (1 ) / 1fbd fbCQ R X Y k       ) bases to maximize the 
vulnerability of the genuine base in case where fbk  false bases 
are detected to be false. The vulnerability of the genuine base 
can be modeled by the contest success function proposed by 
Tullock given the attacked bases: 
 













RX C rx Q c


                 (1) 
Among, pm  is the contest intensity of the game, the 
numerator represents the contest effort the defender takes, and 
 / bpRX C  denotes the contest effort of the attacker by 
considering base protection. Further, we should note that the 
contest intensity is assumed to be exogenous since it relies on 
the behavior of neither the attacker nor the defender.  
As such, the vulnerability of the base given that fbk  false 
bases are detected is 
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The fraction in Eq. (2) illustrates the ratio of the attacked 
bases to the undetected bases, and the defender chooses 
*( ) arg max( ( , ))d fb b d fbQ k v Q k . 
Since the probability of correctly detecting fbk  false bases 
is 
(1 )(1 )
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In the case where the base of the attacker survives the 
preventive strike, the attacker will try to destroy the genuine 
object of the defender. Considering that the genuine object may 
(or may not) be uncovered by the preventive strike, the 
vulnerability of the genuine object can be obtained by 
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where 
*(1 ( ))b dv Q  is the survival probability of the attacker, 
and 
 
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 is the 
destruction probability of the genuine object in case where it is 
exposed by the preventive strike. In addition, the probability to 
detect ftk  as false targets is 
(1 ) y(1 ) y
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(7) 
is the vulnerability of the genuine object if ftk  false targets are 
detected and 
* ( )a ftQ k  is the ( )a ftQ k  that maximizes 
( ( ), )g a ft ftv Q k k  and am  is the contest intensity.  
For any given defender’s and attacker’s resource allocation 
and a given number of detected false bases, the defender will 
choose the optimal number of bases to attack in order to 
maximize the base destruction probability. In addition, for any 
given defender’s and attacker’s resource allocation, the attacker 
always chooses the optimal number of targets to attack in order 
to maximize the destruction probability of the defender’s 
object, given any number of false targets detected and that the 
attacker survives the preventive strike. Nonetheless, for a given 
defense strategy, the attacker chooses its resource allocation 
strategy to maximize its cumulative prospect value considering 
all possible outcomes of the contest, including: 1) its base is 
destructed; 2) its base survives and the genuine target of the 
defender is not destructed too; 3) its bases survives and the 
defender's genuine target is destructed. The attacker’s monetary 
outcomes corresponding to the three possible outcomes of the 
contest are denoted as 
1 2,a ax x  and 3ax , respectively. Moreover, 
the defender chooses its resource allocation strategy in order to 
maximize its cumulative prospect value, given that the attacker 
always chooses the attacking strategy to maximize the 
attacker's cumulative prospect value. Similar to the attacker, the 
defender’s monetary outcomes corresponding to the above 
mentioned three possible outcomes of the contest are denoted 
as 
1 2,d dx x  and 3dx , respectively. The probabilities for the three 
outcomes of the contest are denoted as 
1 2,p p  and 3p . Thus, 
the prospect value of each party is given by 
3 1 2,
= ( ) ( ) ;a k k k k
k a k a a
V v x v x  
 
                       (8) 
1 2 3,
= ( ) ( ) ,d k k k k
k d d k d
V v x v x  
 
                     (9) 
respectively, where ( )kv x  is the value of the possible outcome 
of the game, k

 is the specific weight for the value of the 
potential gain, and k

 is the specific weight for the value of 















                 (10) 
Among, parameters g  and l  are exponential  and    is 
further denoted as the loss parameter. Moreover, the loss-
aversion factor    should be always greater than or equal to one 
since the individuals are essentially more sensitive to losses 
than gains. On the other hand, the decision weights for the 
payoffs can be expressed by 
1
( ) ( );
n n
k j j
j k j k
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where both   and   are model parameters and can also be 
estimated through experiments. Note that ( )w p  and 
( )w p  are monotonic and exhibit inverse S-shapes for some 
specific ranges [7]. 
Throughout our deduction and model foundation, it is easy 
to find that 
*
1 ( ),b dp v Q                                     (15) 
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 * * *2 1 ( ) , ,b d gp v Q v X Y                       (16) 
 * *3 , .gp v X Y                                (17) 
In reality, it is reasonable to assume that 1 30a ax x   
and 3 10d dx x  . However, it is hard to say whether 2ax  
and 
2dx  are positive or not and we will discuss different cases 
to obtain the optimal strategies. We can then rewrite the 
function of prospect value of each party as 
3 3 2 2 1 1 2
3 3 1 1 2
3 3 2 2 1 1 2
( ) ( ) , 0
( ) , 0,
( ) , 0
g l l
a a a a
g l
a a a a
g g l
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(19) 
For any given ( , )x y , the attacker chooses its decision 
variables 
* *( , ) argmax( )aX Y V . The defender chooses 
* * * *( , ) argmax( ( , ))dx y V X Y . 
 
III. OPTIMAL NUMBERS OF BASES AND TARGETS TO 
ATTACK 
Due to space limit, we only illustrate the optimal numbers 
of bases and targets to attack. In particular, we use the same 
parameters setting as those in [8] as: 
10,
2, 2, 0.5.
bp fb at ps ft
pt p a fb ft ex
r R C C C c c
c m m D d d
     
      
 
We first analyze the optimal number of attacked bases of 
the defender. To avoid the tedious calculation, here we only 
consider two different values for each decision parameter: 0.3 
for low resource allocation and 0.7 for high resource allocation. 
In the calculation of attacked bases, the related decision 
parameter of the defender is the portion of resource spent on 
preventive strike and the related decision parameters of the 
attacker are the portions of resources spent on protection and 
false bases, which makes eight possible cases. 
 
Figure 1. Optimal Attacked Bases under Different 
Combination of  ( , , )x X Y  
With different possible numbers of detected bases, we 
perform the optimal number of attacked bases for the defender 
in the Fig. 1. From Fig. 1, one can find that only when the 
resource of the defender spent on preventive strike is high and 
the resource of the attacker spent on false bases deployment is 
high ( , , ) (0.7,0.3,0.7)x X Y  , the optimal number of 
attacked bases will reach three if no false bases are detected to 
be false. Actually, in this case, the amount of resource spent on 
false bases deployment is (1 ) 4.9R X Y  . Given that the 
unit cost for each false base is 2, the attacker is able to deploy 2 
false bases. Since the defender spends 70% of its resource for 
preventive strike, it has enough resource to attack all the three 
bases, one genuine base and two false bases, if no false base is 
detected to be false. On the other hand, when the defender’s 
resource allocated into preventive strike is low ( 0.3x  ), it 
always attacks one base no matter how many false bases are 
deployed by the attacker. Actually, when the resource spent on 
preventive strike is low, further spreading the resources on 
multiple bases would lead to a low strike effort on each base 
under strike. Thus, even the genuine base is under strike, it is 
difficult to destroy it. 
 
Figure 2 Optimal Number of Attacked Targets under Different 
Combination of ( , , , )x y X Y  
Similarly, we obtain the optimal number of attacked targets 
by the attacker under different combinations of resource 
allocation and different numbers of detected false targets. The 
results are as shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that, only for the 
case (0.3, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3), the number of attacked targets reaches 
three given that no false targets are detected. In fact, the 
amount of resource spent on deploying false targets is 
(1 ) 4.9r x y   in this case, which means that two false 
targets are deployed. On the other hand, the amount of resource 
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spent on attack by the attacker is (1 )(1 ) 4.9R X Y   , 
which is almost half of the attacker’s resource. Thus, even no 
false targets are detected to be false, the attacker has enough 
resource to attack all the three targets, one genuine object and 
two false targets. It can also be seen that, when 0.7x  , the 
number of attacked targets is almost always 1 except for (0.7, 
0.7, 0.3, 0.3). In fact, when x is big, the amount of resource left 
for false targets deployment is low. In case 0.3y  , the 
resource left for false targets deployment is (1 ) 0.9r x y  , 
which is not enough for even a single false target. Thus, the 
attacker only needs to focus on the genuine object. In case 
0.7y  , the resource left for false targets deployment is 
(1 ) 2.1r x y  , which is just enough for a single false 
target. For the case (0.7, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3), the attacker’s resource 
on attack is (1 )(1 ) 4.9R X Y   . Thus, the attacker can 
afford to attack both the genuine object and the false targets. 
For the three different cases (0.7,0.7,0.3,0.7), (0.7,0.7,0.7,0.3), 
(0.7,0.7,0.7,0.7), the attacker’s resources on attack are 
respectively 2.1, 2.1, 0.9. For these cases, focusing on one 
target gives the attacker a big chance to destroy the defender’s 
object. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, we analyze the optimal attacked objects. The 
defender may choose to protect the genuine object, set up false 
targets, and employ preventive strike. Similarly, the attacker 
may choose to protect genuine base, set up false bases, and 
employ attack after surviving the preventive strike. A 
preventive strike may expose its own genuine object. To be 
more general, the false targets/bases are imperfectly 
camouflaged in the sense that they may be detected by the 
attacker/defender. By employing cumulative prospect theory, 
we consider players’ risk attitude in the traditional Tullock 
model, which provides a better depiction of the behavior of 
both parties under different risk parameters. Numerical 
examples are presented to illustrate the methods. 
This work can be further extended in the future. First, the 
optimal attack and defense strategy could be obtained through 
backward induction. Since the theoretical solution is hard to 
obtained, people can perform the characteristic of the solution 
by employing simulation. Sensitivity analysis should also be 
conducted on the risk parameters. 
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